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Abstract In this paper, optimal derivative design when multiple firms compete for heterog-
enous customers is studied. Ties in the agents’ best responses generate discontinuous payoffs.
Efficient tie-breaking rules are considered: In a first step, the model presented by Carlier et
al. (Math Financ Econ 1:57–80, 2007) is extended, and results of Page and Monteiro (J Math
Econ 39:63–109, 2003, J Econ Theory 134:566–575, 2007, Econ Theory 34:503–524, 2008)
are used to prove the existence of (mixed-strategies) Nash equilibria. In a second step, the
case of risk minimizing firms is studied. Socially efficient allocations are introduced, and
their existence is proved. In particular, the entropic risk measure is considered.
Keywords Adverse selection · Competing mechanisms · Delegation principle ·
Risk sharing · Pareto optimality
JEL Classification C62 · C72 · D43 · D82 · G14
1 Introduction
In the standard Principal-Agent model, a monopolist (the principal) contracts with heteroge-
neous customers (the agents) on take-it-or-leave-it basis. Heterogeneity is usually captured
by types. An agent’s type is private information; the principal is aware of the distribution of
types, but he cannot distinguish different agents prior to engaging them. This prevents the
principal from extracting the maximum indifference price from each agent type. Instead, he
designs incentive compatible catalogues with the intention of, at least partially, screening the
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market. The characterization of the solutions to problems of this kind can be found, among
others, in the works of Armstrong [2], Mussa and Rosen [15] and Rochet and Choné [23].
This paper considers a model of oligopolistic competition among providers of contingent
claims under adverse selection. Two main challenges emerge when different firms compete
for the business of heterogenous agents: the Revelation Principle no longer fully applies and
ties in the agents’ best-response mappings may emerge. When agents are indifferent between
contracting with different firms, these firms’ payoff functions may have discontinuities. This
precludes the use of classical results (see for example [10]) to guarantee the existence of
Nash equilibria in such games. Our main focus will therefore be on efficient allocations of
risk, i.e. on allocations that maximize the combined performance of the firms.
We first extend the model of profit-maximizing firms presented in [6] to a multi-firm one.
Here the theory of games played under adverse selection comes into play. In order to use
recent results from the theory of catalogue games, we assume that each firm’s strategy set
consists of the closed, convex hull of a finite number of basic products. We show that when
the game is played under a particular kind of tie-breaking rules, which paraphrasing [20] we
call efficient, then it is uniformly payoff secure and reciprocally upper semicontinuous and
hence has a mixed-strategies Nash equilibrium.
Efficient tie-breaking rules also play a key role in our multi-firm extension of the risk
minimization model studied in [11]. In both cases the impact of a single trade on the firm’s
risk evaluation is highly non-linear and depends strongly on the firm’s overall position.1 This
results in two considerable technical difficulties. First, there is no reason to expect that the
firms’ payoff functions will be uniformly payoff secure.2 Second, most of the current results
(e.g. [3,10,18,16]) on existence of Nash equilibria require some form of quasiconcavity.
The exception is [24], where a complete, yet very challenging to verify, characterization of
Nash equilibria is presented. In our model these conditions are only satisfied by the mixed
extension of the game. Even if the game were uniformly payoff secure and weakly recipro-
cally upper semicontinuous, which is by no means a given,3 considering a mixed extension
of the game would mean the following: firms would view linear aggregation of possible
risk evaluations as the way to assess the influence of others’ in their own risk. Whether this
approach is consistent with the ideas behind the theory of convex risk measure is in our opin-
ion debatable. Taking the previous arguments into account, we do not seek the existence of
mixed-strategies Nash equilibria. Instead we establish existence socially efficient allocations
of risk. Such allocations minimize the firms’ aggregate risk. As such, our work can be viewed
as a first attempt to extend the seminal paper of Jouini et al. [12] on efficient risk sharing to
an asymmetric information framework.
In terms of implementability, we show for the case of the entropic risk measure that among
all efficient tie-breaking-rules, one is a constant ratio of market shares. In other words, there
is a “fix-mix” ratio under which firms share the whole market, rather than segmenting it by
agent types. A real-world example where firms offer consumers essentially the same utility
(using different products), and where the assumption of mean-variance optimizing consum-
ers is appropriate, is retail banking. We illustrate this result with a numerical example, in
which we also find that (as expected) competition benefits buyers. The numerical algorithm
1 In a model of profit maximization a firm contracts with some agent type independently of other types as
long as that particular type contributes positively to the firm’s revenues.
2 The “worst-case” tie-breaking rule, where each firm assumes ties will be broken in the most disadvantageous
way for itself, does yield payoff security, but at the cost of reciprocally upper semicontinuity.
3 This would imply the existence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies
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that we use for this example, a hybrid descent method, is also used to analyze an example
where the firms are AV@R-minimizers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 contains the description of
our general framework: The asymmetry of information in the model, the best-response sets
of the agents that give rise to ties, and the role of tie-breaking rules are studied. In Sect. 3
we analyze the game played among profit-maximizing firms, where the main result is the
existence of mixed-strategies Nash equilibria. Section 4 is devoted to the risk-minimization
game, where we prove the existence of socially efficient allocations. Finally, we present in
Sect. 5 numerical algorithms to estimate equilibrium points and socially efficient allocations
in some particular examples, as well as the “fix-mix” result mentioned above. The proofs of
auxiliary lemmas and propositions can be found in the Appendix.
2 General framework
We consider two firms and a continuum of agents. The firms sell structured products to the
agents4. We study both profit maximizing and risk minimizing firms. In the profit-maximiza-
tion case, the firms maximize expected income from trading with the agents; the impact of on
individual trade on the firm’s objective function is hence linear. In the risk-minimization case,
the firms evaluate their overall position using convex risk measures; in this case the impact
of an individual trade on a firm’s objective function is non-linear. The precise mathematical
formulations of the problems at hand require the concepts contained in this section.
2.1 The financially feasible sets
Firms compete by offering the agents derivatives contracts. The financially feasible set for
firm i = 1, 2 is
Xi ⊂ L2 (,F, P) ,
where (,F, P) is a standard probability space. We assume these sets are closed, convex and
bounded, and that 0 ∈ Xi . Any additional requirements on the sets Xi shall be introduced
when necessary.5 In the literature on multi-firm, non-linear pricing games, it is generally
assumed that each firm chooses a compact subset Yi from its financially feasible set, and it
devises a (non-linear) pricing schedule
pi : Yi → R.
Each pair (X, pi (X)) (where X ∈ Xi ) is called a contract. The principles of delegation and
competitive taxation (see for example [18]) allow us, with no loss of generality, to restrict our
study of existence of equilibria to games played over compact subsets of the product-price
space Xi × R (these are known as catalogue games). The boundedness assumption on Xi
implies that prices belong to some compact set P ⊂ R. We write Ci to denote a catalogue
offered by firm i, and (C1, C2) for a catalogue profile (also called a market situation).
4 We have over-the-counter trading in mind.
5 We omit writing i = 1, 2 when we refer to properties shared by both firms.
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2.2 The agents’ preferences
The agents are heterogenous, mean-variance maximizers whose set of types is
 = [θ, θ ] for some θ > 0.
An agent’s type represents his risk aversion: given a contingent claim Y an agent of type θ
assesses its worthiness via the (type-dependent) utility function
U (θ, Y ) = E[Y ] − θ Var[Y ].
The types are private information. They are distributed according to a measure μ, which
is common knowledge, and it is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
This asymmetry of information, also known as adverse selection, prevents the firms from
extracting all the above-reservation-utility wealth form each agent. The knowledge of μ is
therefore essential for the firms.6 In the upcoming sections we require the following auxiliary
lemma, whose proof is a straightforward application of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality:
Lemma 2.1 The family of functions U = {U (θ, ·) | θ ∈ } is uniformly equicontinuous.
2.3 Indirect utilities and best-response sets
When an agent faces a catalogue profile (C1, C2), he chooses a single contract from some
Ci on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Given (C1, C2), the indirect utility of an agent of type θ is:7
v(θ, C1, C2)  sup
{
U (θ, X) − p | (X, p) ∈ Ci for some i
}
.
We assume that the agents have an outside option that yields their reservation utility, which
we normalize to zero. For a fixed market situation, the function v(·, C1, C2) :  → R is
convex, being the pointwise supremum of affine functions of θ. The presence the outside
option guarantees v ≥ 0. The best-response set of the agents of type θ to a certain catalogue
profile is defined as:
L(θ, C1, C2)  argsup
{
U (θ, X) − p | (X, p) ∈ Ci for some i
}
.
In Sects. 3 and 4 we make necessary assumptions on Ci as to guarantee L(θ, C1, C2) = ∅ for
all θ ∈ . The Envelope Theorem (see for example [14]) implies that for any (X (θ), p(θ)) ∈
L(θ, C1, C2)8
v′(θ, C1, C2) = −Var[X (θ)] μ − a.s.. (1)
In particular v′(·, C1, C2) ≤ 0μ-a.s.. Equation (1) provides a valuable link between optimal
contracts (from the point of view of the agents) and the indirect utility functions. In order
to exploit the information contained in μ, firms must choose catalogues that do not offer
the agents incentives to lie about their types. The subset Ci (θ) ⊂ Ci of products that firm i
expects that agents of type θ will choose must satisfy
E[X (θ)] − θVar[X (θ)] − p(θ) ≥ E[Y ] − θVar[Y ] − q, ∀ (X (θ), p(θ)) ∈ Ci (θ),
(Y, q) ∈ Ci .
6 We could make additional assumptions on μ and allow for θ = 0.
7 Our arguments can be easily extended to utility functions of the form U (θ, X, p) = θφ1(X) + φ2(X) − t.
What we require is that U is affine in types and linear in transfers.
8 This envelope structure, which would read v′(θ, C1, C2) = φ1(X (θ)) in the setting mentioned in Eq. 1, is
central to our analysis.
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Catalogues that satisfy this property are called incentive compatible. Let
L(θ, Ci )  argsup
{
U (θ, X) − p | (X, p) ∈ Ci
}
,
then Ci is incentive compatible if and only if Ci (θ) = L(θ, Ci ).9 A catalogue where the
products intended for agents of type θ yield at least their reservation utility is said to be indi-
vidually rational. Since all reservation utilities are zero, an individually rational catalogue
satisfies
E[X (θ)] − θVar[X (θ)] − p(θ) ≥ 0 ∀ (X (θ), p(θ)) ∈ L(θ, Ci ).
2.4 Tie-breaking rules and market segmentation
A crucial feature of multi-firm games is the presence of ties. Since no convexity assumption is
made on the catalogues’ structure, the sets L(θ, C1, C2) and L(θ, Ci ) need not be singletons.
There can be both inter- and intra-firms ties, i.e. an agent may be indifferent between two
products that are offered by distinct firms, or maybe between two contracts that are offered
by the same firm. In what follows we study mechanisms via which ties are broken, as well
as the partitions of  that are generated by tie-breaking. Given a catalogue profile (C1, C2),
we define
v(θ, Ci )  vi (θ)  sup
{
U (θ, X) − p | (X, p) ∈ Ci
}
.
The vi ’s are related to v(θ, C1, C2) via v(θ, C1, C2) = max
{
v(θ, C1), v(θ, C2)
}
. Some
important properties of the functions v(θ, Ci ) are summarized in Lemma 2.2 below, which
follows from Proposition 2.2 in [6].
Lemma 2.2 Let (C1, C2) be a catalogue profile and assume L(θ, Ci ) = ∅ for all θ ∈ ,
then:
1. The functions v(·, Ci ) :  → R are convex.
2. If Ci is incentive compatible then −Var[Xi (θ)] ∈ ∂v(θ, Ci ) for all (Xi (θ), pi (θ)) ∈
Ci (θ). In particular, the equation −Var[Xi (θ)] = v′(θ, Ci ) holds μ-a.s..
If for θ0 ∈  we have vi (θ0) > v−i (θ0), then the agents of type θ0 will contract with firm i.
The set of types that are indifferent between the firms’ offers is
0 
{
θ ∈  | v(θ, C1) = v(θ, C2)
}
.
To avoid ambiguities we assume that if vi (θ) = v−i (θ) = 0 then the corresponding agents
opt for the outside option. The market is segmented into the sets
1  {v1 > v2}, 2  {v2 > v1} and 0.
In order to deal with types in 0 whose indirect utility is not zero, we define the set of
tie-breaking rules (henceforth TBRs) as
F 
{ f ∈ L0[a, 1] | 0 ≤ f ≤ 1}.
9 It has been shown in [23] that in general principal-agent models it is not possible to perfectly screen the
market. In most instances there is a non-negligible set of agents who are pushed down to their reservation
utilities (bunching of the first type). There is another set where agents stay above their reservation levels, but
they choose the same product despite the fact of their different preferences (bunching of the second type). In
all likelihood, this behavior is inherited by multi-firm models.
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From this point on, given a TBR f we write f1 = f and f2 = 1 − f. Then fi ≡ 1
on i , fi ≡ 0 on −i , and for θ0 ∈ 0 the proportion fi (θ0) contracts with firm i. We
shall rephrase the interaction of the firms in terms of the indirect utilities generated by the
catalogues they offer. This allows us to use well established convex analysis machinery. Let
Ci 
{
v :  → R+ | v ≥ 0, ∃{X (θ)}θ∈ ⊂ Xi s.t. v′(θ) = −Var[X (θ)]
}
.
These are the sets of all possible (single-firm) indirect utilities that can be generated from
incentive compatible catalogues contained in Xi . Incentive compatibility is reflected in the
requirement v′(θ) = −Var[X (θ)], as in Lemma 2.2.
Proposition 2.3 The sets Ci are compact for the topology of uniform convergence.
2.5 Some comments on efficiency
We close this section with some informal comments on efficiency of allocations in our frame-
work. The fundamental theorems of welfare economics establish the equivalence between
competitive equilibria (in complete markets) and Pareto-efficient allocations. Agents who
trade on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (as in our model) do not respond to given prices in the
same way as in a competitive market. As a consequence, the mechanisms that would guar-
antee (Pareto) efficiency in a Walrasian setting break down. In the sequel we establish the
existence of allocations that are efficient in the sense that they maximize aggregate profits,
respectively minimize aggregate risk. Specifically, we show that if firms are expected-profit
maximizers and if ties are broken in favor of the firm that benefits the most from contracting
with the agent, Nash equilibrium allocations are efficient (see Theorem 3.11). It is unclear
to us that efficiency can be achieved in a similar fashion if firms minimize risk. This leads
us to the notion of socially efficient allocations which we study in Sect. 4. In either case,
the presence of a social planer (a regulator) is necessary to achieve efficiency. This indirect
market participant plays two important roles: First, he must enforce certain kinds of TBRs in
order to guarantee efficient outcomes. Second, he must make sure that individual rationality
at the level of firms is preserved. The latter may be achieved by further restricting the choice
of admissible TBRs, or by establishing a payment scheme among firms.10
3 Profit maximization
In this section we analyze a non-cooperative game played among profit-maximizing firms
under adverse selection. Our model is an extension to [6]. We show that if efficient tie-break-
ing rules are implemented (possibly through the influence of a regulator), then the game
possesses a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
3.1 The firms’ strategy sets and payoff functions
The theory of equilibria in multi-firm games developed (among others) in [13,17] and [18]
requires the strategy sets to be compact metric spaces. Moreover, the agents’ preferences
10 An example of a regulated market with a payment scheme is the German health insurance one. For historical
reasons some insurers face higher risk customers (e.g. hand laborers) than others. All companies must provide
at least a minimal standard of coverage (which is rather high). Furthermore, no potential customer may be
turned away. This environment exposes some firms to higher levels of risk. In order to correct the asymmetries
in the market, a system of cash-transfers has been set in place.
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must be continuous with respect to a topology that makes the strategy sets compact. In other
words the strategy sets are generally closed and bounded sets of a finite-dimensional vector
space. In the sequel we assume that Xi is the closed convex hull of a finite number of basic
products {X1i , . . . , Xmii }. This would be the case, for instance, if firms bundled products
and sold fractions to the agents, whose size would not allow them to imitate the firms. We
assume that the cost to firm i of delivering Xi ∈ Xi is given by a lower semicontinuous
function Ki : Xi → R. The profit of firm i when it sells claim Xi given the price schedule
pi : Xi → R is pi (Xi ) − Ki (Xi ). The Competitive Taxation Principle (see [18]) states that
the game played over product-price catalogues, i.e. elements of
Pi 
{
Ci ⊂ Xi × P | Ci closed
}
,
is as general as the one played over closed subsets of Xi and non-linear price schedules. We
recall that P ⊂ R is the compact set where feasible prices lie. The firms strategy sets Pi
are thus the sets of all compact subsets of Xi × P. We endow Pi with the Hausdorff metric
h. Since Xi × P is a compact metric space, so is (Pi , h) (see, for example [1], Sect. 3.17);
furthermore, Tychonoff’s theorem guarantees that P  P1 × P2 with the corresponding
product metric h p is also compact and metric. We write B(P) for the Borel σ -algebra in P.
The following proposition allows us to substitute a catalogue profile (C1, C2) for
(⋃
θ
L(θ, C1),
⋃
θ
L(θ, C2)
)
,
as these sets are closed, thus compact:
Proposition 3.1 For any catalogue Ci ∈ Pi , the set ⋃θ L(θ, Ci ) is closed.
The maximal attainable profit for firm i from type θ given the (incentive compatible) cata-
logue profile (C1, C2) is
πi (θ, C1, C2)  max
{
(p − K (X))11{vi ≥v−i }(θ) | (X, p) ∈ Ci
}
.
Here the functions vi are as defined in Sect. 2.4, and C−i enters πi via v−i . The functions πi
are the building blocks of the firms’ payoff functions.
Proposition 3.2 (Page Jr. [17]) The maps πi :  × P → R are upper semicontinuous on
P and B() × B(P)-measurable.
For a given TBR f, the payoff function of firm i is given by
	i (C1, C2) 
∫

πi (θ, C1, C2) fi (θ)μ(dθ).
These payoff functions exhibit a highly discontinuous behavior, due to the presence of ties.
Only agents who make a positive contribution to a firm’s revenues contract with it. This fact
plays an important role in the analysis of payoff security contained in Sect. 3.3.2.
3.2 Efficient tie-breaking rules and reciprocal upper semicontinuity
In this section we introduce the notion of efficient TBRs:
Definition 3.3 Given a catalogue profile (C1, C2), a tie-breaking rule f ∈ F is called
efficient if
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• πi (θ, C1, C2) ≥ π−i (θ, C1, C2) implies fi (θ) > 0,
• πi (θ, C1, C2) < π−i (θ, C1, C2) implies fi (θ) = 0.
The definition above is equivalent to saying that f ∗ is efficient given the catalogue profile
(C1, C2) if and only if
∑
i
	i ( f ∗, C1, C2) = sup
f ∈F
∑
i
	i ( f, C1, C2),
This shows that in general efficient TBRs are endogenously determined.
Definition 3.4 A game
{
(	i ,Pi )
}
is said to be reciprocal upper semicontinuous (RUSC)
for a given TBR f if the mapping
(C1, C2) →
∑
i
	i ( f, C1, C2)
is upper semicontinuous.
The notion of RUSC games was introduced by Dasgupta and Maskin in [7] (labeled as
complementary discontinuous or u.s.c.-sum games) and later generalized by Reny in [22] in
order to prove the existence of Nash equilibria in certain discontinuous games. It is shown
in [22] that RUSC is inherited by the mixed extension of a game.
Lemma 3.5 (Page Jr. and Monteiro [19]) If the game {(Pi ,	i )
}
is played using efficient
TBRs, then it is RUSC.
Notice that the definition of efficient TBR, together with the linear aggregation of type-wise
profits, implies that the mapping (C1, C2) → ∑i 	i ( f, C1, C2) is independent of the TBR
played if the latter it is efficient.
3.3 Existence of Nash equilibria
In this section we study necessary conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in the
firms’ game. Since the payoff functions 	i are not quasiconcave, one cannot prove the exis-
tence of pure-strategies equilibria using standard results. Instead we analyze the existence of
mixed-strategies equilibria.
3.3.1 Defining the mixed-strategies game
Let M(P j ) be the set of probability measures on (Pi ,B(Pi )). We endow the mixed cata-
logue strategy sets M(Pi ) with the σ(X∗, X)-topology generated by the dual pair 〈L0(Pi ,
B(Pi )),M(Pi )〉. The game is played as follows: Each firm chooses an element λi ∈ M(Pi ),
and its profit under the profile λ = (λ1, λ2) is given by
	i (λ) 
∫
P
	i (C1, C2)λ(dC), (2)
where λ(dC) = λ1(dC1)λ2(dC2) is the corresponding product measure. By Proposition 3.2
the integrand is measurable, thus expression (2) is well defined. The game {(M(Pi ),	i )
}
is the mixed catalogue game that extends
{
(Pi ,	i )
}
.
Definition 3.6 A mixed profile λ is a Nash equilibrium for the game
{
(M(Pi ),	i )
}
if
	i (λi , λ−i ) ≥ 	i (λ′i , λ−i ) for all λ′i ∈ M(Pi ).
A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for
{
(M(P j ),	i )
}
can be viewed as an equilibrium
in pure strategies for its mixed extension.
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3.3.2 Uniform payoff security
A game is said to be compact if the players’ strategy sets are compact subsets of a topological
space, and their payoff functions are bounded. The mixed extension of the game in hand is
a compact game. This is due to the fact that the sets M(Pi ) are closed, convex and bounded
subsets of (L0(Pi ,B(Pi )))∗, thus by the Banach–Alaoglu theorem they are σ(X∗, X)-com-
pact. Reny provides sufficient conditions for existence of a Nash equilibrium in a compact
game in the presence of discontinuous payoff functions. A key requirement is that the game
is payoff secure:
Definition 3.7 Given the payoffs 	i : Pi → R, the catalogue game
{
(Pi ,	i )
}
is payoff
secure if for all (C1, C2) ∈ P, and  > 0 there exist C∗i ∈ Pi and δ > 0 such that
	i (C∗i , C ′−i ) ≥ 	i (Ci , C−i ) −  for all C ′−i ∈
{
D ∈ P−i | h p(D, C−i ) < δ
}
.
Payoff security of a game does not imply the same property for its mixed extension; however,
such is the case with uniform payoff security (see Theorem 1 in [19]). Proving uniform payoff
security of a game is simpler than dealing with the weak∗-topology to show payoff security
of its mixed extension.
Definition 3.8 The game
{
(Pi ,	i )
}
is uniformly payoff secure if for all i = 1, 2, Ci ∈ Pi
and  > 0 there exist C∗i such that for all C−i ∈ P−i there exists δ > 0 that satisfies
	i (C∗i , C ′−i ) ≥ 	i (Ci , C−i ) −  for all C ′−i ∈
{
D ∈ P−i | h p(D, C−i ) < δ
}
.
Proposition 3.9 The game
{
(Pi ,	i )
}
is uniformly payoff secure (hence the game{
(M(P j ),	i )
}
is payoff secure).
Our result on existence of Nash equilibria relies on the following
Theorem 3.10 (Reny [22]) Suppose that G = {(Xi , ui )}mi=1 is a compact game which is
also quasiconcave, reciprocally upper semicontinuous and payoff secure, then it possesses a
pure-strategies Nash equilibrium.
It follows from Lemma 3.5 that the (compact) game {(M(Pi ),	i )
}
is RUSC. The payoff
functions are linear in each firm’s strategy, hence quasiconcave. Proposition 3.9 then allows us
to apply Theorem 3.10 to the mixed extension of the game
{
(Pi ,	i )
}
to obtain the following
Theorem 3.11 The game
{
(Pi ,	i )
}
possesses a mixed-strategies Nash equilibrium.
4 Risk minimization
Consider an insurance market dominated by a few large firms. Each insurer holds a portfolio
of risky assets (its customers policies). In order to minimize its risk exposure (assessed in
terms of a convex risk measure), each firm lays off parts of its risk on individual agents
(via over-the-counter trading of derivatives contracts). In this section we analyze a model
for such a risk minimization problem. The model is the multi-firm version of the one intro-
duced in [11]. In contrast with the previous section, we do not seek to prove the existence
of Nash equilibria, but rather of socially efficient allocations. The main difficulty towards
guaranteeing Nash equilibria stems from the non-linear, per-type impact on the firms’ risk
assessments. This precludes us from being able to show uniform payoff security and RUSC.
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4.1 The firms’ strategy sets and risk assessments
The initial risky endowment of each firm is represented by a random variable Wi ∈ L2 (,
F, P). Firm i assesses its risk exposure using a convex and law invariant risk measure
i : L2 (,F, P) → R ∪ {+∞},
which has the Fatou property. In particular, for any X ∈ L2 and any m ∈ R, i (X + m) =
i (X) − m.11We refer the reader to [5] and Sect. 4.3 in [9] for detailed discussions on this
topic. We restrict the firms’ choices to catalogues of the form
Ci =
{
(Xi (θ), pi (θ))
}
θ∈.
This has to be done for technical reasons, thus in this section we focus our attention on
inter-firms ties. We are not, however, dealing with a direct revelation mechanism: even if
firm 1 were to offer the individually rational and incentive compatible catalogue C1, the
presence of firm 2 might dissuade agents of type θ0 from choosing (X1(θ0), p1(θ0)). For a
given catalogue profile (C1, C2) and a given TBR f, the position of firm i after trading is
Wi −
∫
i
(pi (θ) − Xi (θ))μ(dθ) −
∫
0
(pi (θ) − Xi (θ)) fi (θ)μ(dθ),
where i and 0 are as defined in Sect. 2.4. From Eq. (1) we have that, if X (θ) ∈ L(θ, Ci ),
then form almost all θ ∈ v′i (θ, Ci ) = −Var[X (θ)]. Therefore vi (θ, Ci ) = E[X (θ)] +
θv′i (θ, Ci ) − pi (θ). If we rename X (θ) = X (θ) − E[X (θ)],12 then we may write pi (θ) =
θv′i (θ, Ci ) − vi (θ, Ci ). Firm i’s risk assessment after trading is
Ai (C1, C2, f )  Ri (C1, C2, f ) − Ii ((C1, C2, f ),
where
Ri (C1, C2, f )  i
(
Wi −
∫
i
Xi (θ)μ(dθ) −
∫
0
Xi (θ) fi (θ)μ(dθ)
)
,
denotes firm i’s risk. The corresponding income is given by
Ii ((C1, C2, f ) 
∫
i
(θv′i (θ) − vi (θ)μ(dθ) +
∫
0
(θv′i (θ) − vi (θ)) fi (θ)μ(dθ).
When a catalogue profile (C1, C2) is offered, the corresponding indirect utility functions
(v1, v2) show how the market is segmented. The more interesting set is 0, i.e. the set of
indifferent agents. Within 0, there are two intrinsically different situations. First, v1 and
v2 may be identical over a non-negligible subset. These could be regarded as “true” ties, in
the sense that they will have different impacts on the firms’ risk assessments under differ-
ent TBRs. Second, there could be types for which v1 and v2 are secant (see Definition 4.1
below). We show below that given our assumptions on μ, these types do not have a direct
impact on the aggregate incomes. They do, however, indicate the points where agents switch
from contracting with one firm to the other. In other words they show where the customers’
affiliations shift.
11 This property is known as translation invariance. We require it repeatedly below.
12 This is possible due to the translation invariance of i , and fully characterizes pi in terms of vi .
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Definition 4.1 Given a pricing schedule (v1, v2) ∈ C1 × C2, we say that there is a shift in
the customers’ affiliations at θ ∈ int() if
(v1(θ−) − v2(θ−)) · (v1(θ+) − v2(θ+)) < 0.
Proposition 4.2 For any pricing schedule (v1, v2) ∈ C1×C2 the set s has at most countably
many elements. Furthermore, the derived set of s has measure zero.
As a consequence of the Proposition 4.2, the set of pre-images of the crossings of the graphs
of two functions v1 ∈ Ci and v2 ∈ C2 has μ-measure zero, which yields the following
Corollary 4.3 Let v1 ∈ C1 and v2 ∈ C2, then the set {v1 = v2} ∩ {v′1 = v′2} is of μ-measure
zero.
The aggregate income of the firms is then independent of the TBR, namely
∑
i
Ii (C1, C2, f ) =
∫
0
(θv(θ) − v′(θ))μ(dθ) +
∑
i
∫
i
(θv′i (θ) − vi (θ)μ(dθ).
Finally we define
A(C1, C2, f ) 
∑
i
Ai (C1, C2, f ).
4.2 Socially efficient allocations
A market situation (C∗1 , C∗2 ), together with a TBR f ∗ is said to be a socially efficient alloca-
tion (henceforth SEA) if it minimizes the aggregate risk in the economy and if it is individually
rational at the firms’ level; in other words if A(C∗1 , C∗2 , f ∗) solves the problem
  inf
v
inf
f
inf
X
{
A(C1, C2, f ) | −Var[Xi (θ)] = v′i (θ), Ai (C1, C2, f ) ≤ i (Wi )
}
.
As it was the case in Lemma 2.2, the variance constraints −Var[Xi (θ)] = v′i (θ) capture
the incentive compatibility of the catalogues Ci . The constraint Ai (C1, C2, f ) ≤ i (Wi )
represents firm i’s individual rationality. In absence of a competitive market one cannot
rely on equilibrium pricing to take care of the issue of individual rationality. An alternative
would be to establish a cash-transfer system, which should be supervised by the regulator.
We comment further on the latter in Sect. 4.2.4. In the remainder of this section we study the
existence of SEAs, and we show that the presence a regulator is required in order for such
allocations to be attainable and/or implementable. Our existence result depends heavily on
the implementation of efficient TBRs.
Definition 4.4 Let C = (C1, C2) be a catalogue profile. A tie-breaking rule f¯ ∈ F is
efficient for C if
A(C1, C2, f¯ ) = inff ∈F
{
A(C1, C2, f )
}
.
From the definition above one observes that efficient TBRs are endogenously determined.
Here we encounter the first need for the social planner in our risk-minimization setting. It
could be the case that unless regulated, efficient TBRs would not be implemented.
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4.2.1 Minimizing the risk for fixed incomes and tie-breaking rule
In a first step, we fix (v1, v2) ∈ C1 × C2 (hence the firms’ incomes), as well as f ∈ F. We
shall abuse notation slightly and write Ri (v1, v2, Xi , f ) for Ri (C1, C2, f ). We then analyze
the problem
1  inf
(X1,X2)
{∑
i
Ri (v1, v2, Xi , f )
∣
∣ − Var[Xi (θ)] = v′i (θ) and Ai (v1, v2, Xi , f ) ≤ i (Wi )
}
.
This problem can be decoupled into the sum of the infima, since the choice of Xi bears
no weight on the evaluation of R−i . We study the solution(s) to the following single-firm
problems:
inf
Xi
{
Ri (vi , v−i , Xi , f )
∣
∣ − Var[Xi (θ)] = v′i (θ) and Ai (v1, v2, Xi , f ) ≤ i (Wi )
}
.
To deal with the individual rationality constraints, we define
X v, fi 
{
Xi ∈ Xi | Ai (v1, v2, Xi , f ) ≤ i (Wi )
}
,
which is the set of individually rational products for the given price schedule (v1, v2), and
X k
v
i
i 
{
X ∈ Xi | ‖Xi‖22 ≤ kvi
}
,
where kvi  vi (a) − vi (0). The set X
kvi
i contains all the products that can be structured as to
construct incentive compatible catalogues given (v1, v2). The quantity kvi provides a bound
to the L2-norm of the products via the constraint −Var[Xi (θ)] = v′i (θ). We elaborate further
into the kvi ’s in Appendix B, where we provide an outline of the proof of Lemma 4.5. The
proof is analogous to that of Theorem 2.3 in [11], and we include it for completeness.
Lemma 4.5 For v ∈ C1 ×C2 and f ∈ F given, if X k
v
i
i ∩X v, fi = ∅ then there exist Xv, fi ∈ Xi
such that
1 = R1(v1, v2, Xv, f1 , f ) + R2(v1, v2, Xv, f2 , f ).
In order to establish the existence of an efficient TBR it is important to characterize the
optimal contracts Xv, fi . We show below that X
v, f
i can be decomposed into a θ -dependent
function and an ω-dependent random variable. To this end, we construct the Lagrangian
associated to minimizing Ri (vi , v−i , Xi , f ) subject to the moment conditions E[Xi (θ)] = 0
and Var[Xi (θ)] + v′i (θ) = 0, and we compute the Frechét differential of Ri at Xi in the
direction of h ∈ Xi :
R′i (Xi )h = ′i
(
Wi −
∫
i
Xi (θ)μ(dθ) −
∫
0
Xi (θ) fi (θ)μ(dθ)
)(
−
∫
i
h(θ)dθ −
∫
0
h(θ) fi (θ)μ(dθ)
)
.
Since, for all H ∈ L2(, P), the map K → ′i (H)K is linear, it follows from the Riesz
representation theorem that there is a random variable Z Xv, fi
∈ L2(, P) such that
R′i (Xi )h =
∫

Z Xv, fi
(
−
∫
i
h(θ)dθ −
∫
0
h(θ) fi (θ)μ(dθ)
)
dP.
Let g : F → L0(,μ) be given by
g( f ) = 11i + 110 f.
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The operator Ri has an extremum at Xi under our moment constraints if there exist Lagrange
multipliers λi , ηi ∈ L2(,μ) such that
∫

∫

h(θ)
(
−Z Xv, fi g( fi )(θ) + ηi (θ) + 2λi (θ)Xi (θ)
)
μ(dθ)dP = 0
for all h ∈ Xi . Since (θ, ω) → −Z Xv, fi g( fi )(θ) + ηi (θ) + 2λi (θ)Xi (θ) is an integrable
function, the DuBois–Reymond lemma implies
−Z Xv, fi g( fi )(θ) + ηi (θ) + 2λi (θ)Xi (θ) = 0. (3)
Using the moment conditions EP[Xv, fi (θ)] = 0 and Var[Xv, fi (θ)] = −v′i (θ) we obtain
ηi (θ) = EP
[
Z Xv, fi
]
g( fi )(θ) and λi (θ) =
g( fi )(θ)
√
Var
[
Z Xv, fi
]
2
√
−v′i (θ)
.
Inserting the expressions for the Lagrange multipliers into Eq. (3) yields
Xv, fi (θ) =
√
−v′i (θ)Z¯v, fi , (4)
where
Z¯v, fi 
(
Z Xv, fi
− E[Z Xv, fi
])/√
Var
[
Z Xv, fi
]
.
Equation (4) shows that the minimizers of problem 1 form collinear families in X . More-
over, the randomness stemming from (, P) and the one induced by (,μ) are decoupled.
This property will prove to be key in Sect. 4.2.2. The previous discussion yields the following
characterization result:
Proposition 4.6 Let (Xv, f1 , X
v, f
2 ) be a solution to 1. Then X
v, f
i takes the form
Xv, fi (θ, ω) =
√
−v′i (θ)Z¯v, fi (ω)
for some normalized random variable Z¯v, fi on (,F, P).
If either Xv, f1 or X
v, f
2 do not satisfy Ai (v1, v2, X
v, f
i , f ) ≤ i (Wi ), then using the standard
convention inf{∅} = ∞ we would have 1 = ∞. In terms of the program , this guarantees
that only pricing schedules and TBRs that offer the possibility of constructing individually
rational catalogues stand a chance to be chosen.
4.2.2 Existence of efficient tie-breaking rules
In this section we show that for a given price schedule (v1, v2) there is a TBR f v such that
(Xv, f
v
1 , X
v, f v
2 )minimize the aggregate risk evaluation of the firms. Forv = (v1, v2) ∈ C1×C2
we define
R˜i (v1, v2, f )  i
(
Wi − Zv, fi (ω)
( ∫
i
√
−v′i (θ)dθ +
∫
0
fi (θ)
√
−v′i (θ)μ(dθ)
))
and
Fv 
{
f ∈ F |
∑
i
R˜i (v1, v2, f ) < ∞
}
.
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We have to solve the problem
2  inf
Fv
∑
i
R˜i (v1, v2, f ).
If Fv = ∅, then as above 2 = ∞. Otherwise we must verify the lower semicontinuity of
the mapping
f → R˜1(v1, v2, f ) + R˜2(v1, v2, f ), f ∈ Fv.
To this end consider a minimizing sequence { f n} ⊂ Fv. The Banach–Alaoglu theorem guar-
antees that { f n} is weakly convergent13 to some f v ∈ Fv. Since Vi (θ) 
√
−v′i (θ) belongs
to L2(,μ) for all vi ∈ Ci , then
∫
0
f ni (θ)Vi (θ)dθ →
∫
0
f vi (θ)Vi (θ)μ(dθ). (5)
Let
a
v,n
i 
∫
i
Vi (θ)dθ +
∫
0
f ni (θ)Vi (θ)μ(dθ).
For f v we define avi analogously. From (5) we have that av,ni → avi . Since ‖Zv, f
n
i ‖2 ≤ 1
for all n, there exists Zvi ∈ L2(, P) such that ‖Zvi ‖2 ≤ 1 and
Zv, f
n
i
w.−→ Zvi (weak convergence).
Therefore Y v,ni  a
v,n
i · Zv, f
n
i converges weakly to Y
v
n  avi · Zvi . It follows from the Fatou
property of i that
i (Wi − avi · Zvi ) ≤ lim infn→∞ i (Wi − a
v,n
i · Zv, f
n
i ).
From the lower semicontinuity of the norm in terms of weak convergence we have
Var
[
Zvi Vi (θ)
] ≤ −v′i (θ).
Proceeding as in Sect. 4.2.1, we have that
R˜i (v1, v2, f v) ≤ i (Wi − avi · Zvi ).
Therefore
2∑
i=1
(
R˜i (v1, v2, f v) − Ii (v1, v2, f v)
) = inf
f ∈F
{ 2∑
i=1
(
R˜i (v1, v2, f ) − Ii (v1, v2, f )
)}
.
We denote by (Xv1 , Xv2) any optimal list of claims associated to the pricing schedules (v1, v2)
and the TBR f v. For notational convenience we define
A(v1, v2) 
2∑
i=1
(
R˜i (v1, v2, f v) − Ii (v1, v2, f v)
)
.
13 We omit writing “up to a subsequence” when exploiting the compactness of sets, but it should of course
be kept in mind.
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4.2.3 Minimizing with respect to the firms’ incomes
To finalize the proof of existence of a SEA, we let {(vn1 , vn2 )} be a minimizing sequence of
2∑
i=1
(
R˜i (v1, v2, f v) − Ii (v1, v2, f v)
)
.
We get from Proposition 2.3 that there exist (v¯1, v¯2) ∈ C1 ×C2 such that vni → v¯i uniformly.
This implies that V ni → V¯i almost surely (see for example Proposition A.4 in [8]). Moreover,
for any θ ∈  where convergence holds, it is uniform. We have from Fatou’s lemma and the
fact that 0 ≤ −Ii (v1, v2, f ) for any (v1, v2) ∈ C1 × C2 and any f ∈ F that
2∑
i=1
−Ii (v¯1, v¯2, f v¯) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
2∑
i=1
−Ii (vn1 , vn2 , f v
n
).
Let 〈·, ·〉 be the canonical inner product in L2(, P). In order to deal with the risky part of
the firms’ problems we require the following
Lemma 4.7 Let {φn}, {ψn} ⊂ L2(, P) and φ, ψ ∈ L2(, P) be such that
φn
‖·‖2−−→ φ and ψn w.−→ ψ, then 〈φn, ψn〉 → 〈φ,ψ〉.
We show in Proposition 4.8 that if it the market segments exhibited no jumps in their limiting
behavior, then there would exist SEAs. By absence of jumps we mean that
11n0
a.s.−−→ 11¯0 and 11ni
a.s.−−→ 11¯i ,
where ¯0 = {v¯1 = v¯2} and ¯i = {v¯i > v¯−i }. This “nice” convergence of the ni ’s is
by no means the general scenario. As an example let vn1 ≡ v1 and vn2 = v1 + 1/n. Here
n1 ≡ ,2 ≡ ∅, but in the limit only ¯0 = ∅. Nonetheless, the existence result of SEAs
under the assumption of convergence of the indicator functions is relevant for the general
case, and we present it below.
Proposition 4.8 Let {(vn1 , vn2 )}, (v¯1, v¯2) ⊂ C1 × C2 such that vni → v¯i uniformly. Assume
that 11nj → 11¯ j , and let X¯1, X¯2 and f¯ be the (weak) limits of Xv
n
1 , X
vn
2 and f v
n
. Then
lim inf
n→∞
2∑
i=1
R˜i (vn1 , v
n
2 , f v
n
) ≥
2∑
i=1
i
(
Wi −
∫
¯i
X¯iμ(dθ) −
∫
¯0
f¯i X¯iμ(dθ)
)
≥
2∑
i=1
i
(
Wi −
∫
¯i
X v¯i μ(dθ) −
∫
¯0
f v¯i X v¯i μ(dθ)
)
,
where (X v¯1 , X v¯2 , f v¯) solves the social planer’s problem for (v¯1, v¯2).
We now deal with the possibility of non-convergence of the indicator functions. We first
observe that the n0’s are closed subsets of , which is compact. The set
2¯ := {A ⊂  | A = ∅ and A is closed}
endowed with the Hausdorff metric h : 2¯ → R+ is a compact metric space (see for exam-
ple [1], Chapter 3). If n0 = ∅ infinitely often, then there exists ˆ0 ∈ 2¯ such that n0
h−→ ˆ0.
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Moreover, ˆ0 is contained in ¯0. If, on the contrary, n0 = ∅ for all but a finite number of
n’s, then we define the Hausdorff limit of {n0} as the empty set, which is again contained
in ¯0. In both instances we observe that there can only be more ties in the limit, and hence
more ways of breaking them. This suggests that the aggregate risk in the limit is indeed no
greater than the aggregate risk in the pre-limit.
As for the sets ni , if θ is not eventually in either of them, then either θ ∈ ˆ0 or it is a type
whose affiliation alternates. However, the limiting behavior of the latter is that of indiffer-
ence, due to the convergence of the functions vni . In other words, an agent type θ eventually
always contracts with the same firm i , alternates between firms or is always indifferent.
Thus, θ ∈ n0 for all sufficiently large n or θ ∈ ¯0. We now decompose the type space into
subsets for which the associated indicator functions converge. We define
˜n0  ¯0 \ n0, and ˜ni  ni \ ˜n0 .
The sets ˜ni contain the “surviving customers”, in the sense that there will be no jumps
towards indifference from types in ˜ni at the limit; ˜
n
0 is the set of “alternating customers”.
By construction
 = ˜n0 ∪ n0 ∪ ˜n1 ∪ ˜n2 = ¯0 ∪ ˜n1 ∪ ˜n2 .
The following lemma shows that the sets ˜ni converge to the sets of agent types that contract
with firm i when (v¯1, v¯2) is offered.
Lemma 4.9 For i = 1, 2 we have 11˜ni → 11¯i .
Let us now assume that the social planer’s problem were such that, at every stage n, all agent
types that belong to the set of “alternating customers” are deemed indifferent. This results in
more tie-breaking possibilities. Specifically we consider the social planer’s problem
A∗(vn1 , vn2 ) = inff n∈F infX
{ 2∑
i=1
i
(
Wi −
∫
˜ni
Xni μ(dθ) −
∫
˜n0∪n0
f ni Xni μ(dθ)
)∣∣
∣Var[Xni (θ)] = −(vni )′(θ)
}
.
A subset of the possible choices of the f ni ’s is Fn0 , which is defined as the set of f˜ ∈ F such
that
f˜ (θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0, vni (θ) < v
n
−i (θ)
1, vni (θ) > v
n
−i (θ)
f (θ), otherwise,
for some TBR f ∈ F. We then have that A∗(vn1 , vn2 )|F0 = A(vn1 , vn2 ). Thus, A(vn1 , vn2 ) ≥
A∗(vn1 , vn2 ). Consider a minimizing sequence {(vn1 , vn2 )} with (uniform) limit (v¯1, v¯2).
Lemma 4.9 guarantees that 11˜ni → 11¯i ; moreover ˜
n
0 ∪n0 ≡ ¯0 so patently 11˜n0∪n0 → 11¯0 .
These two facts allow us to apply Proposition 4.8 to A∗(vn1 , vn2 ), which yields
lim inf
n→∞ A(v
n
1 , v
n
2 ) ≥ lim infn→∞ A
∗(vn1 , vn2 )
≥
2∑
i=1
i
(
Wi −
∫
¯i
X∗i μ(dθ) −
∫
¯0
f ∗i X∗i μ(dθ)
)
,
where (X∗1, X∗2, f ∗) solves the social planer’s problem for (v¯1, v¯2). This shows that (X∗1, X∗2,
f ∗) is indeed optimal because {(vn1 , vn2 )} was required to be a minimizing sequence. We have
proved the following
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Theorem 4.10 If firm i assesses risk using a law invariant risk measure i : X →
R ∪ {+∞}, which has the Fatou property, and if it offers catalogues of the form Ci ={
(Xi (θ), pi (θ))
}
θ∈, then there exists a socially efficient market situation.
4.2.4 Individual rationality revisited
Assume that (C∗1 , C∗2 , f ∗) is a solution to the problem  without the individual rationality
constraints Rˆi (C1, C2, f ) ≤ i (Wi ). Since both firms could simply offer (0, 0), a minimi-
zation of A(·, ·, ·) would be IR on the aggregate level. Then there would exist r ≥ 0 (the rent
of risk exchange) such that
A(C∗1 , C∗2 , f ∗) = 1(W1) + 2(W2) − r
In this setting, the regulator would have enforce the cash-transfer. We define a transfer SEA
to be a quadruple (C∗1 , C∗2 , f ∗, T ∗) such that
 = A(C∗1 , C∗2 , f ∗); Rˆ1(C∗1 , C∗2 , f ∗) − T ∗ ≤ 1(W1); Rˆ2(C∗1 , C∗2 , f ∗) + T ∗ ≤ 2(W2);
and T ∗ ∈ [r1, r2] for some r1, r2 ∈ R such that r2 − r1 = r. The arguments contained in
Sects. 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 can be immediately applied to prove the following
Corollary 4.11 If firm i assesses risk using a law invariant risk measure i : X →
R ∪ {+∞}, which has the Fatou property, and if it offers catalogues of the form Ci ={
(Xi (θ), pi (θ))
}
θ∈, then there exists a transfer socially efficient market situation.
5 Examples: risk Minimization
In this section we focus our attention on two well-known risk measures: average value at
risk and entropic. For the entropic risk measure, we show there is a SEA where both firms
service all of the agents. In this case the optimal TBR is a constant proportion over the whole
market. We refer to such efficient TBRs as “fix-mix” rules.
5.1 Entropic-risk-minimizing firms
In what follows we assume firms use the entropic risk measure to assess their risk exposure,
i.e.
i (X) = 1
γi
ln EP
[
exp(−γi X)
]
.
The coefficient γi represents firm i’s risk aversion. This particular choice of risk measures,
which is closely related to exponential utility, allows us to further the analysis into the
structure of SEAs. For vi and f given, Proposition 4.6 allows us to write program 1 (the
minimization with respect to the firms’ claims for fixed incomes and TBR in Sect. 4.2.1) as
inf
(Z1,Z2)∈i ×2
2∑
i=1

(
W − Zi
( ∫
i
√
−v′i (θ)μ(dθ) +
∫
0
√
−v′i (θ) fi (θ)μ(dθ)
))
,
where
i := {Z ∈ Xi | E[Z ] = 0, ‖Z‖22 = 1}.
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This allows us to write (see Sect. 3.4.2 in [11]) the minimization problem of firm i as that of
finding a stationary point to the Lagrangian
L(Z , τ, κ) = ln
(∫

e−γi (W+Za(vi , fi ))dP
)
+ τ
∫

ZdP + κ
∫

Z2dP.
Here τ and κ are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the moment constraints, and
a(vi , fi ) =
∫
i
√
−v′i (θ)μ(dθ) +
∫
0
√
−v′i (θ) fi (θ)μ(dθ).
We have the following implicit representation for the optimal claims given vi and f, which
has a unique solution for each realization zv, fi of Z
v, f
i and wi of Wi :
Zv, fi = −
e−γi (Wi +Z
v, f
i a(vi , fi )) − E
[
e−γi (Wi +Z
v, f
i a(vi , fi ))
]
√
Var
(
e−γi (Wi +Z
v, f
i a(vi , fi ))
) . (6)
Remark 5.1 The indirect utility functions vi and the TBR fi only affect the optimal claims
Zv, fi via the “aggregator” a(vi , fi ).
Remark 5.1 has interesting repercussions for the socially efficient TBRs. Indeed, assume the
firms have initial endowments Wi and they are characterized by risk aversion coefficients
γi . Theorem 4.10 guarantees the existence of a SEA (v∗1 , v∗2 , f ∗, Z∗1 , Z∗2), which yields the
following aggregate risk in the economy:
1
(
W1 − a(v∗1 , f ∗1 ) Z∗1
) + 2
(
W2 − a(v∗2 , f ∗2 ) Z∗2
) + I [v∗1 , v∗2 ], (7)
where I [v∗1 , v∗2 ] represents the firms’ aggregate income (which is independent of f ∗). We
know from Remark 5.1 that any modification on f ∗ that leaves a(v∗i , f ∗i ) unchanged bears
no weight on the value of expression (7). We can redefine
f ∗(θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0, v1(θ) < v2(θ)
1, v1(θ) > v2(θ)
f ∗(θ), otherwise,
and define
v∗(θ)  max
{
v∗1(θ), v∗2(θ)
}
.
This allows us to write
a(v∗i , f ∗i ) =
∫

√−(v∗)′(θ) f ∗i (θ)μ(dθ).
Once we have defined the TBR over , we may go one step further and write
K 
∫
θ
√−(v∗)′(θ) f ∗(θ)μ(dθ)
∫
θ
√−(v∗)′(θ)μ(dθ) ,
then
a(v∗1 , f ∗1 ) = K
∫

√−(v∗)′(θ)μ(dθ) and a(v∗2 , f ∗2 ) = (1 − K )
∫

√−(v∗)′(θ)μ(dθ).
An interesting economical conclusion from the computations above is that there exists a
SEA that consists of both firms servicing the whole market, and splitting the customers in
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a K to 1 − K proportion. This follows from the fact that only v∗ (the upper envelope of
the original v∗i ) appears in each firm’s program. In markets such as regulated health-insur-
ance, where firms are legally prevented from abstaining from contracting with any agent, the
regulator may oversee that a socially optimal proportion of the market is serviced by each
firm.
5.2 Simulations (Entropic-risk minimizing firms)
In this section we provide the numerical analysis of a particular example of the entropic-risk
minimizing firms analyzed above. To this end we set
• Dimension of the space defining v: 6, dimension of : 14,
• W1 = 0.5 ∗ (−1,−3,−9,−3,−1,−0.2,−0.1,−0.1,−0.2, 1,−3,−9,−3,−1)T ,
• W2 = 0.5∗(−0.03,−0.1,−0.18,−0.2,−1,−3,−9,−10,−3,−1,−0.2,−0.18,−0.1,
−0.03)T ,
• risk aversion coefficient γ = 2.
5.2.1 Risk assessments
Let us benchmark the aggregate risk in the competitive economy against the risk in a monop-
olistic setting. We first fix f ≡ 1. This corresponds to a model in which firm 1 acts as a
monopolist and firm 2 has no access to the market. The a-priori aggregate risk in the econ-
omy is 7.36. The risk assessment of firm 1 is reduced from 3.53 to 2.16 after it has traded
with the agents.The risk of firm 2 remains unchanged. Below we plot the numerical result for
Z , as well as the theoretical one from Eq. (6) in Fig. 1a and the corresponding minimizing
v (the agents’ indirect utility) in Fig. 1b. Likewise, if we fix f ≡ 0, which again yields
a principal-agent setting for firm 2, we obtain that this firm’s initial risk is 3.84, which is
reduced to 2.30 after trading. Finally, once we let f vary, the aggregate risk decreases from
7.36 to 5.39, and the corresponding final risk assessments for the firms are 2.17 and 2.67
respectively. Each firm is worse off in the presence of competition, but aggregate risk in the
economy is lower. Risk decreases from 7.36 to 5.99 when only firm 1 is active, and from
7.36 to 5.72 if it is firm 2 who trades with the agents.
5.2.2 Risk profiles
With respect to the ex-ante and ex-post risk profiles, we observe that trading has a smoothing
effect, flattening spikes that correspond to the bad states of the World. However the basic
shape of the risk profile remains, which is in contrast to what we find in Fig. 4 of our AV@R
example. This is presented in Fig. 2, where the 14 elementary events have been connected by
lines for illustration purposes. Figure 3 shows the agents’ indirect utilities associated to each
firm’s offer, and compares it to the indirect utility for the agents who face a monopolist (in
this case firm 1). The market is shared at a 0.42 to 0.58 ratio between the firms. We observe
that the upper envelope v(θ) = max{v1(θ), v2(θ)} dominates the monopolistic situation for
all agents. This example is in line with the intuition that competition among sellers benefits
the buyers. A point could be made that the regulator should make sure that enough incentives
exist for all firms to engage in risk-minimizing trading, as it is socially desirable.
Remark 5.2 Arguably, the implementation of an efficient TBR in full generality could prove
to be a daunting task. However, the structure of Zv, fi presented in Eq. (6) suggests that in
123
288 Math Finan Econ (2011) 5:269–297
Fig. 1 Comparison results for the f ≡ 1 case
general these variables depend on v and f only via the integral expression a(v, f ). If such
were the case, one could achieve an optimum by choosing an efficient “fix-mix” TBR, where
each firm caters to a constant proportion of the whole market. The latter clearly makes the
implementation considerably simpler.
5.3 Simulations (AV@R-minimizing firms)
In this section we study an example where the firms are average value-at-risk minimizers.
Recall that for λ ∈ (0, 1], and X ∈ L∞(, F, P), one defines
AV @Rλ(X) 
1
λ
∫ λ
0
V @Rγ (X)dγ,
where
V @Rγ (X)  inf
{
m | P{X + m < 0} ≤ γ }.
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Math Finan Econ (2011) 5:269–297 289
Fig. 2 Positions before and after trading
We use the following initial parameters:
• Dimension of the space defining v: 6, dimension of (): 14,
• W1 = 0.02 ∗ (−1,−2,−4,−10,−4,−2,−1,−0.8,−0.5,−0.3, 0, 0, 0, 0)T ,
• W2 = 0.05 ∗ (−0.03,−0.1,−0.18,−0.2,−1,−3,−9,−10,−3,−1,−0.2,−0.18,
−0.1,−0.03)T ,
• levels for the AV@R: λ1: 0.05 and λ2: 0.1
The initial aggregate initial risk assessment is 0.68, which decreases to 0.21 after trading. In
Fig. 4 we compare the firms’ positions before and after trading. We observe that in contrast
with the entropic-risk-measure case (see Fig. 2), the ex-post shapes of the risk profiles have
been significantly altered. This is due to the fact that the risk measure in hand places a heavier
weight on the bad states of nature, even at the cost of the originally good ones. Figure 5a
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Fig. 3 Indirect utilities under monopoly and oligopoly
shows the indirect utility functions corresponding to the catalogue that each firm offers, and
in Fig. 5b we have plotted an efficient TBR.
Remark 5.3 It should be noted that in neither of the examples presented above were the
individual rationality constraints for the firms binding. This is essential to implement the
“fix-mix” TBR without the need of a cash transfer. Although f plays no role in the aggregate
income I [v1, v2], it does enter the IR constraints of each firm. If one wanted to implement a
“fix-mix” TBR without a cash transfer scheme, they would in general run into a two-equa-
tions-one-unknown issue as soon as an IR constraint bound.
6 Conclusions
We have extended the principal-agent models of profit maximization found in [6] and risk
minimization found in [11] to a multi-firm setting. Both of these works deal with over-
the-counter trading of derivatives under adverse selection. On the profit maximization side,
we have used results of Page Jr. and Monteiro([17–19] and [20]). These authors, together
with Bagh and Jofré ([3]), provide testable conditions that allow for Reny’s results to be used
in multi-firm-agent games. We have shown the existence of (mixed-strategies) Nash equilib-
ria when efficient tie breaking rules are used (and most likely enforced by a regulator). Our
contribution on risk minimization follows on the footsteps of Barrieu and El Karoui’s ([4]),
and Jouini, Schachermayer and Touzi’s ([12]) work on optimal risk sharing for convex risk
measures. In [12] it is shown that optimal allocations are Pareto optimal but not necessarily
individually rational. A cash transfer, also called the rent of risk exchange, could be neces-
sary to address this issue. Implementing a cash transfer and/or imposing socially efficient tie
breaking rules are the raisons d’être for a regulator in our model. We did not prove (as in the
profit-maximization case) that the game is uniformly payoff secure and (weakly) reciprocal
upper semicontinuous. Since the game is not quasi-convexity, we would have to consider its
mixed extension. This brings us to the following conceptual issue: what is expected risk?
Convex risk measures can be (robustly) represented as a worst-case analysis over a family
of probability measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to the reference one.
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Fig. 4 Positions before and after trading
However, not all of these measures (which can be interpreted as possible distributions of the
future states of the World) are given the same weight. Indeed, they are penalized according
to a function that maps the space of probability measures into the extended Reals. By consid-
ering a mixed extension of our risk-minimization game, we implicitly assume that “Nature”
and the firms behave in qualitatively different ways. In our view this would be inconsistent.
Instead, we introduced the notion of socially efficient allocations and proved the existence of
such. We believe that an important contribution of this paper is to show that, within our styl-
ized setting, non-regulated, over-the-counter markets cannot be guaranteed to be efficient (in
the sense of the welfare theorems). The extension of our general setting to one where agents
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Fig. 5 Indirect utilities and a possible efficient TBR
have heterogenous initial endowments (multi-dimensional agent types) and (we believe more
interestingly) to a dynamic framework are left for future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.3: When firm i designs a product line, it takes into account that
−M2 ≤ E[X ] − θVar[X ] ≤ M.
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Therefor all p ∈ P must be below M to satisfy the individual rationality constraint. In coun-
terpart −M2 ≤ p, otherwise all agents would be guaranteed an indirect utility above their
reservation utility. Since ‖X‖2 ≤ M for all X ∈ Xi , then |v′i | ≤ M for all vi ∈ Ci , thus
0 ≤ vi ≤ 3 ·max
{
M, M2
}
. The convexity of the elements of the (closed) set Ci implies they
are locally Lipschitz (see for example [21]); moreover, the L2-boundedness of Xi together
with Eq. (1) imply the Lipschitz coefficients are uniformly bounded. This in turn means that
Ci is a bounded, closed and uniformly equicontinuous family, which by the Arzelà–Ascoli is
then compact for the topology of uniform convergence. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Consider (X¯ , p¯) ∈ cl(⋃θ L(θ, Ci )), then there exists a sequence
{(Xn, pn)} ⊂ ⋃θ L(θ, Ci ) such that (Xn, pn)
‖·‖2×|·|−−−−→ (X¯ , p¯). By construction (Xn, pn) ∈
L(θ, Ci ) for some θ ∈ , call it θn . Passing to a subsequence if necessary we may assume
there is θ¯ ∈  such that θn → θ¯ and (Xn, pn) → (X¯ , p¯) pointwise. If (X¯ , p¯) ∈ ⋃θ L(θ, Ci )
we are done, so let us assume the contrary, thus
E[X¯ ] − θ¯Var[X¯ ] − p¯ < E[X ] − θ¯Var[X ] − p ∀ (X, p) ∈ L(θ¯ , Ci ). (8)
By definition E[Xn] − θnVar[Xn] − pn ≥ E[X ] − θnVar[X ] − p ∀ (X, p) ∈ Ci . How-
ever, the (a.s.) convergence of the sequence {(Xn, pn)} implies E[X¯ ] − θ¯Var[X¯ ] − p¯ ≥
E[X ] − θ¯Var[X ] − p ∀ (X, p) ∈ Ci . This would imply (X, p) ∈ L(θ¯ , Ci ), contradicting
Eq. (8). unionsq
Proof of Lemma 3.5: Consider the mapping (C1, C2) → ∑i 	i ( f ∗, C1, C2). If f ∗ is effi-
cient then
∑
i
	i ( f ∗, C1, C2) = sup
f ∈F
∑
i
	i ( f, C1, C2)
= sup
f ∈F
∑
i
∫

πi (θ, C1, C2) fi (θ)μ(dθ)
=
∫

max
i
πi (θ, C1, C2)
∑
i
fi (θ)μ(dθ) for any f ∈ F
=
∫

max
i
πi (θ, C1, C2)μ(dθ).
It follows from Proposition 3.2, that (C1, C2) → maxi πi (θ, C1, C2) is upper semicontinu-
ous, hence so is
∑
i 	i ( f ∗, C1, C2). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3.9: Let Ci ∈ Pi and  > 0 and define
Ci 
{
(X, p − ) | (X, p) ∈ Ci and p −  ≥ Ki (X)
} ∪ {(0, 0)}.
Lemma 2.1 implies there is δ > 0 such that if d
(
(X, p), (X ′, p′)
)
< δ (where d(·, ·) is the
distance generated by ‖ · ‖2 × | · |) then for all θ ∈ 
|U (θ, X) − p − U (θ, X ′) + p′| < . (9)
Assume first that πi (θ, Ci , C−i ) >  and let (X, p) ∈ Ci be such that U (θ, X) − p =
πi (θ, Ci , C−i ). Then (X, p − ) ∈ Ci . Now consider C ′−i such that h p(C−i , C ′−i ) < δ, and
let (X ′, p′) ∈ C ′−i . By definition there exist (Y, q) ∈ C−i such that d
(
(Y, q), (X ′, p′)
)
< δ,
and by Eq. (9)
U (θ, X) − (p − ) ≥ U (θ, Y ) − (q − ) > U (θ, X ′) − p′.
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The latter implies that (X ′, p′) /∈ L(θ, Ci , C ′−i ) and in turn that an efficient TBR f for
(Ci , C
′−i ) satisfies fi (θ) = 1. Thus πi (θ, Ci , C ′−i ) fi (t) ≥ πi (θ, Ci , C ′−i ). The inequality
above is trivially fulfilled if πi (θ, Ci , C−i ) ≤ . We have that for any deviation C ′−i such
that h p(C−i , C ′−i ) < δ and for any efficient TBR f
	i (Ci , C
′−i ) ≥
∫

πi (θ, Ci , C
′−i ) fi (θ)μ(dθ) −  = 	i (Ci , C−i ) − .
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4.2: The set s(v1, v2) is the union of the closures of the sets
1s 
{
θ ∈  | v1(x) = v2(x), v′1(x) = v′2(x)
}
and s 
{
θ ∈  | v1(x) = v2(x), v′1(x) = v′2(x), |v1(x˜) − v2(x˜)| > 0 ∀ x˜ ∈ B(, x)\
{x},  > 0} . The set 1s is denumerable and nowhere dense. This follows directly from the
convexity of v1 and v2 and the fact that the corresponding supporting planes to graph{v1}
and graph{v2} at (θ, v1(θ)) are secant. By definition 2 is denumerable and nowhere dense,
since any two of its elements can be separated. Therefore cl{1s } and cl{s } are themselves
denumerable and nowhere dense. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 4.7: Adding and subtracting 〈φ,ψn〉 from |〈φn, ψn〉 − 〈φ,ψ〉| we obtain
∣
∣〈φn, ψn〉 − 〈φ,ψ〉
∣
∣ ≤ ∣∣〈φn − φ,ψn〉
∣
∣ + ∣∣〈φ,ψn − ψ〉
∣
∣.
Since {ψn} is a weakly convergent sequence, it is bounded. Let K¯ be such bound, then using
the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality we have
∣
∣〈φn, ψn〉−〈φ,ψ〉
∣
∣ ≤ K¯ ‖φn−φ‖2+
∣
∣〈φ,ψn−ψ〉
∣
∣.
As n → ∞, the first summand on the righthand side of the inequality converges to zero due
to the strong convergence of the φn’s to φ; the second summand converges to zero due to
the weak convergence of the ψn’s to ψ, which concludes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4.8: The second inequality follows from the definition of (X¯1, X¯2, f¯ ).
To show that the first one holds, we first use Proposition 4.6 and write
∫
ni
Xv
n , f vn
i μ(dθ) −
∫
n0
f ni Xv
n , f vn
i μ(dθ)
= Zvn , f v
n
i
∫

(
11ni (θ) − f v
n
i 11n0 V
n
i (θ)
)
μ(dθ)  avni · Zv
n , f vn
i .
The assumption on the convergence of the indicator functions 11nj implies that V
n
i 11n0
a.s.−−→
V¯i 11¯0 . Since |V ni 11n0 |, |V¯i 11¯0 | ≤ M and μ() < ∞, by Lebesgue Dominated Convergence
we get V ni 11n0
‖·‖2−−→ V¯i 11¯0 . Hence, by Lemma 4.7 we have that av
n
i → a¯i , where
a¯i 
∫

(
11¯1(θ) − f¯ 11¯0 V¯i (θ)
)
μ(dθ).
Therefore avni · Zv
n
i
w.−→ a¯i · Z¯i , and the Fatou property of the risk measure yields
2∑
i=1
Ri (v¯1, v¯2, Xi , f ) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
2∑
i=1
R˜i (vn1 , v
n
2 , f v
n
).
unionsq
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Proof of Lemma 4.9: Let θ ∈  be given. There are two possible cases. Either there exists
N ∈ N such that if n > N , then θ ∈ ˜ni or there exists a subsequence {vnk1 , vnk2 } such
that θ /∈ ˜nki for all nk . In the former case the (uniform) convergence of the vni ’s implies
v¯i (θ) > v¯−i (θ). In the latter case, either θ eventually belongs to ˜n−i , in which case conver-
gence of the indicator functions follows or θ ∈ ˜n1 ∩ ˜n2 infinitely often. In this case θ ∈ ˜n0
and we again have convergence of the indicators. unionsq
Appendix B: Existence of minimizers to 1
In this appendix we give an overview of the proof of existence of minimizers to problem 1
in Sect. 4.2.1, which is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.3 in [11]. The steps to be taken
are the following:
1. We fix (v1, v2) ∈ C1 ×C2 and relax the variance constraint to −Var[Xi (θ)] ≤ v′i (θ). We
observe that ‖Xi‖22 = vi (a)−vi (0)  kvi . Let Ki be the uniform bound on the elements
of Ci (see Prop. 2.3), then ‖Xi‖22 ≤ kvi ≤ Ki .
2. The convexity of i implies that the set X v, fi 
{
Xi ∈ Xi | Ai (v1, v2, Xi , f ) ≤
i (Wi )
}
is convex. The fact that ρi has the Fatou property implies that X v, fi is closed.
3. Since the mapping
Xi →
∫
i
Xi (θ)dθ −
∫
0
Xi (θ) fi (θ)dθ,
is a linear, then Xi → Ai (v1, v2, Xi , f ) is a convex mapping. The set X k
v
i
i 
{
X ∈
Xi | ‖Xi‖22 ≤ kvi
}
is closed, convex and bounded. Therefore the relaxed optimization
problem has a solution X˜v, fi , as long as X Ki ∩ X v, fi = ∅.
4. The variance constraint can be made binding by structuring the products X˜vi into X
v, f
i =
X˜v, fi + αY. Here Y is independent of θ and α :  → R integrates to zero.
Description of the algorithm used in Sects. 5.2 and 5.3
In this appendix we provide a brief description of our numerical algorithm, whose aim is to
estimate solutions to the problem
inf
(Z , f,v)
2∑
i=1
[
i
(
Wi − Zi
∫ 1
a
√−v′(θ) fi (θ)dθ
) +
∫ 1
a
(v(θ) − θ v′(θ)) fi (θ)dθ
]
subject to:
• fi ≥ 0, f1 + f2 = 1; v convex, v ≥ 0, v′ ≤ 0, v(1) = 0; E[Zi ] = 0, Var[Zi ] = 1;
• i
(
Wi − Zi
∫ 1
a
√−v′(θ) fi (θ)dθ
) + ∫ 1a (v(θ) − θ v′(θ)) fi (θ)dθ ≤ i
(
Wi
)
. It should be
noted that in the examples presented in Sect. 5, this constraint was not binding.
In order to do so, we set a discretization level n, and we work with the following structures:
• f1(λ)  ∑n−1k=0 λk11[a+k 1−a
n
,a+(k+1) 1−a
n
], f2 = 1 − f1, 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1.
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• v′(·) 
( ∫ 1
· − ddθ
√−v′(θ)dθ + √−v′(1)
)2
, we shall denote v˜  − ddθ
√−v′(θ), and
γ 
√−v′(1) ≥ 0. There is a one-to-one correspondence between v˜ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0 and
functions v that satisfy the requirements of being convex, non-increasing and non-nega-
tive.
• We go one step further and define v˜(α)  ∑n−1k=0 αk11[a+k 1−a
n
,a+(k+1) 1−a
n
], αi ≥ 0.
• Zi  (β i0, . . . , β id−1) ∈ Rd , 1d
∑d−1
k=0 β ik = 0, 1d
∑d−1
k=0(β ik)2 ≤ 1. Following the results
presented in Appendix B, we have relaxed Var[Zi ] = 1 to Var[Zi ] ≤ 1.
In this setting we have that
i
(
Wi − Zi
∫ 1
a
√−v′(θ) fi (θ)dθ
) = ri (α, β, γ, λ).
and the problem amounts to minimizing the aggregate risk
∑2
i=1 ri (α, β, γ, λ) subject to
ri (α, β, γ, λ) ≤ ri (0, 0, 0, 0) and subject to constraints on α, β, γ and λ specified earlier.
The latter are convex (in fact most of them are linear)in the corresponding variables. A crucial
property of the functions ri : Rn+2d+1+n → R is that for any three fixed entries, they are
convex on the remaining variable. We use an iterative algorithm that performs a one-step,
first-order descent in each direction alternately, such that the aggregate risk decreases in
each step. At each of the steps we encounter the problem of minimizing a convex function
with respect to convex constraints. Our coding has been done in Java, and we have used
the NetBeans IDE 6.8 environment. In the case of AV @R, we have used the or124. jar
package (OR-Objects 1.2.4) to calculate the required gradients. The descent procedures are
all based on a local linearization of the function to be minimized, as well as of the constraints.
Since all of these objects are convex, they can be locally approximated by the corresponding
subgradients. The linearized function is minimized, subject to the linearized constraints, on
a cubic neighborhood of the current point. This reduces to a linear optimization problem.
Again the linear optimization package included in or124. jar is used to obtain a minimizer.
If this point does not satisfy the constraints (we carry the linearization error), a correction
procedure is performed to obtain a feasible point close to the prior one (See Fig. 6). Finally,
it is verified whether at this feasible point the value of the objective function has decreased.
Fig. 6 Dealing with non-feasible points
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Otherwise, the procedure is repeated starting with a cube whose size length is half of the
original one.
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